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Abstract 
 
Quantification of the uncertainties in future climate projections is crucial for the implementa-
tion of climate policies. Here we provide a review of projections of global temperature change 
over the 21
st century for the six illustrative SRES emission scenarios that assume no policy 
intervention, based on the latest generation of coupled general circulation models, climate 
models of intermediate complexity and simple models, and we assess uncertainty ranges and 
probabilistic projections from various published methods and models. Despite substantial im-
provements in climate models, projections for given scenarios on average have not changed 
much in recent years. Recent progress has however increased the confidence in uncertainty 
estimates and now allows a better separation of the uncertainties introduced by scenarios, 
physical feedbacks, carbon cycle, and structural uncertainty. Projection uncertainties are now 
constrained by observations and therefore consistent with past observed trends and patterns. 
Future trends in global temperature resulting from anthropogenic forcing over the next few 
decades are found to be comparably well constrained. Uncertainties for projections on the cen-
tury timescale, when accounting for structural and feedback uncertainties, are larger than cap-
tured in single models or methods. This is due to differences in the models, the sources of un-
certainty taken into account, the type of observational constraints used, and the statistical as-
sumptions made. We show that as an approximation, the relative uncertainty range for pro-
jected warming in 2100 is the same for all scenarios. Inclusion of uncertainties in carbon cycle 
climate feedbacks extends the upper bound of the uncertainty range by more than the lower 
bound.   2
  
1. Introduction 
 
Climate models forced with changing anthropogenic greenhouse gas, sulphur dioxide and 
other aerosol emissions project global-mean surface air temperature to increase substantially in 
the future. The range of uncertainty given in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Third Assessment Report (TAR) for the end of the 21
st century  (2100 relative to 1990)  
was 1.4 - 5.8°C (Cubasch et al., 2001) for the SRES non-intervention emissions scenarios 
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000). However, the interpretation of that temperature range is diffi-
cult for at least two reasons. First, it is a range produced by several models, with no indication 
of a likelihood distribution, and no confidence attached to the range, e.g. the probability for a 
temperature rise above that range is unknown. Second, the range combines uncertainties in 
both emission scenarios and climate model responses and gives no clear indication of the rela-
tive importance of these two quite distinct types of uncertainty. Uncertainties in the response 
of the climate system to a given emissions scenario, dominated by uncertainties in the climate 
sensitivity and the rate of ocean heat uptake, are determined by our incomplete understanding 
of physical processes and the limitations of climate models. The strength of the relevant cli-
mate feedbacks cannot significantly be influenced by human activities. The uncertainties in 
emissions on the other hand are an uncertainty related to human actions and decisions, and in 
that sense are a choice rather than an intrinsic uncertainty. It is therefore important to consider 
the uncertainty in the climate response separately for each emissions scenario (Knutti et al., 
2002; Wigley, 2004). 
 
While in a subjectivist Bayesian framework, likelihoods or conditional probabilistic distribu-
tions of warming for a given scenario may be estimated by standard methods, deriving likeli-
hoods of warming across scenarios is more problematic, because no likelihoods have been 
attached to any of the individual SRES scenarios. In the absence of such information, equal 
probability has sometimes been assumed for each scenario (see e.g. Wigley and Raper, 2001). 
Another limitation of analyses based on the SRES scenarios is that they assume no efforts to 
mitigate climate change, and thus at least on the lower bound do not span the full economically 
and technically feasible range of future emission pathways that mitigation would allow. 
 
Progress has been made since the publication of the IPCC TAR (IPCC, 2001) in quantifying 
and understanding uncertainties in future temperature projections. Probabilistic projections 
with a variety of models of different complexity and different statistical methods have 
emerged, using large ensembles of simplified models, statistical emulators, and combining 
observations with models using Bayesian methods. Climate responses have been simulated 
with a larger number of and more comprehensive atmosphere ocean general circulation models 
(AOGCMs) than ever before, and uncertainties in carbon cycle - climate feedbacks (i.e., the 
fact that ocean and terrestrial carbon uptake depends on the climatic state) have been estimated 
using models of different complexities. 
 
Here we present global temperature projections from the most recent coordinated model inter-
comparison performed for the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (Meehl et al., 2007), 
and identify the robust conclusions as well as the differences arising from the use of different 
probabilistic methods. We provide a more comprehensive discussion than in AR4 in order to 
achieve a more in-depth view on the various methods, where and why they agree or differ,   3
expand on how the newer AOGCM projections compare to earlier ones, show why the AR4 
results differ from the TAR, and quantify the contributions of scenario, climate feedback, car-
bon cycle feedback, and structural uncertainty to the total uncertainty. We show that relative 
uncertainties are the same for different SRES emissions scenarios, independent of the total 
amount of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
2. Results 
 
2.1. Probability density functions and ranges from individual methods 
 
In the large coordinated modeling effort WCRP CMIP3 (World Climate Research Coupled 
Model Intercomparison Project phase 3), in preparation for the IPCC AR4, twenty-three 
AOGCMs have simulated climate change over the 20
th century and made projections into the 
future for low, medium and high non-intervention emissions scenarios (SRES B1, A1B and 
A2, respectively) that are based on different assumptions about population growth, economic 
development, energy use and globalization. Although problematic for reasons detailed below, 
the multi-model mean and standard deviation of global temperature change is shown in Figure 
1. The ranges in that figure are best seen as an illustration of uncertainty ranges, despite the 
fact that the figure uses the most comprehensive models available. The main difficulties in 
interpreting an ensemble of opportunity are the following: First, the set of models represents 
an ensemble of opportunity; neither sampled randomly nor systematically, and is not designed 
to span an uncertainty range. Different models have different climate sensitivities and the 
range and distribution of these sensitivities differ from ranges and distributions estimated from 
observational data. Second, the models are not all independent (Tebaldi and Knutti, 2007). 
Third, not all models have simulated all scenarios. This results in the spread for the higher 
scenario A2 apparently being smaller than for the lower scenario B1. However, for the subset 
of models that have run both scenarios, the spread is larger for A2 than for B1, consistent with 
the constant relative uncertainty argument further discussed below. Fourth, different models 
use different sets of forcings, and they quantify the common forcings differently (Collins et al., 
2006; Forster and Taylor, 2006). Fifth, it seems important to note that for prescribed emis-
sions, carbon cycle processes, themselves dependent on the climate change response, substan-
tially affect the modeled atmospheric CO2 concentration (Friedlingstein et al., 2006) and thus 
radiative forcing, yet all AOGCMs considered here prescribe atmospheric CO2 from offline 
carbon cycle simulations, and many of them use the same atmospheric concentration scenario. 
While they all account for carbon cycle climate feedback uncertainties, their projected temper-
ature range is smaller than it would be if they all had accounted for the uncertainty in the car-
bon cycle climate feedbacks. Physical feedbacks determine the temperature response to a giv-
en atmospheric concentration. This temperature response can be characterized by the equili-
brium climate sensitivity (the global equilibrium surface temperature response to a doubling of 
atmospheric CO2) and the transient climate response (TCR, the global surface temperature 
response at the time of CO2 doubling in a scenario where atmospheric CO2 increases by 1%/yr, 
i.e. in a twenty year mean period centred at year 70). By definition, equilibrium climate sensi-
tivity and TCR do not include carbon cycle feedbacks, because both concepts connect temper-
ature changes to a given CO2 concentration. The effect of the changing climate on the carbon 
cycle is treated as a feedback and is considered in all climate change projections presented 
here. While a temperature response to a given emission can be defined (i.e. combining the 
physical and biogeochemical feedbacks) as a reference number (like climate sensitivity de-  4
scribing only the physical feedbacks), it is of limited use, since the temperature response to a 
given emission depends both on the time and the climate state.  
 
The difficulty in interpreting the TAR results in terms of probability has prompted several at-
tempts to provide probability density functions (PDFs) of global temperature increase. Note 
that each of these distributions is of course conditional on the model, method and data con-
straint that are used, and that the percentiles of the distributions reflect a degree of belief that 
warming would fall within certain temperature ranges if we were to follow these scenarios, 
rather than a frequency of occurrence in an experiment that is repeated many times. Figure 2 
(left column, lower part of each panel) summarizes the available cumulative distribution func-
tions (CDFs), for the six illustrative SRES scenarios, for the early (2020-29, dashed CDFs) and 
late 21
st century (2090-2099, solid CDFs), relative to the 1980-1999 average. In short, Wigley 
and Raper (2001) produce PDFs from a large ensemble with a simple upwelling diffusion en-
ergy balance model, varying climate sensitivity, ocean vertical diffusivity, carbon cycle feed-
backs and aerosol forcing. Parameters are varied in ranges considered plausible by the authors 
(most ranges were taken from the IPCC TAR), no formal observational constraints are applied. 
The uncertainty in climate sensitivity (being the largest contribution to the total uncertainty for 
a given scenario) is represented as a log-normal distribution  where the 1.5 to 4.5°C range cor-
responds to the 90% confidence interval. Knutti et al. (2003) consider uncertainties in climate 
sensitivity, ocean diffusivity and different mixing parameterizations (horizontal/vertical diffu-
sion, isopycnal diffusion, Gent/McWilliams mixing) (Knutti et al., 2000), carbon cycle feed-
backs, and all radiative forcing components individually in an intermediate complexity climate 
model (EMIC) with a dynamical ocean and an energy balance atmosphere, and constrain the 
multi-thousand member ensemble with the observed global surface warming (Jones and Mo-
berg, 2003) and ocean heat uptake (Levitus et al., 2000). A uniform prior distribution from 1 to 
10°C is assumed for climate sensitivity. Because climate sensitivity is poorly constrained from 
the observed global mean warming trends (Forest et al., 2002; Knutti et al., 2002; Frame et al., 
2005) and the use of a uniform prior distribution on climate sensitivity, that study finds larger 
probabilities for high warming than most others. The simplified models used in these studies 
have the advantage that a large portion of the parameter space can be explored, parameters like 
climate sensitivity can be adjusted to match specific distributions, and very large ensembles of 
simulations can be generated. On the other hand, those types of models inevitably have to sim-
plify the description of feedback processes.  
 
Stott and Kettleborough (2002) and Stott et al. (2006) use a detection-attribution method to 
derive best guess scaling factors and uncertainty ranges, by which model simulated greenhouse 
gas and aerosol responses each have to be multiplied to best match 20
th century climate 
change. These scaling factors are then used to estimate the best estimate and uncertainty range 
of future change and account for uncertainties in the estimate of greenhouse gas forcing to 20
th 
century change caused by internal variability and uncertainty in natural forced variability as 
well as for uncertainty in climate sensitivity and ocean heat uptake. Carbon cycle uncertainties 
are not considered. This method does not explicitly prescribe a prior distribution for climate 
sensitivity, but in effect it implicitly uses a uniform prior on TCR (or equivalent, the green-
house gas attributable warming, see also Frame et al. (2006)), which a priori assigns lower 
probability to high values of climate sensitivity than what the uniform prior on climate sensi-
tivity (Knutti et al., 2002) does. Therefore, for long term projections where climate sensitivity 
becomes increasingly important, the Stott et al. (2006) method tends to assign lower probabil-  5
ity to very high warming. The use of more detailed information and a noise reducing metric on 
surface temperature changes also leads to reduced uncertainty and a narrower PDF. The detec-
tion method is based on one or more AOGCMs, which is a more accurate representation of the 
climate system than the simple models or EMICs, but it has to assume a certain linearity in the 
way model mismatch against observations over the past decades projects into the future.  
 
Furrer et al. (2007b; 2007a) use a Bayesian spatial hierarchical method to obtain PDFs at each 
grid point from the set of AR4 AOGCMs. The assumptions are that the response from each 
AOGCM can be decomposed into the ‘true’ underlying large-scale climate change signal plus 
a small-scale noise component representing model error and internal variability. The noise 
component is specific to each model, but assumed to have zero average across all models. The 
climate change signal is decomposed into a series of spherical harmonics and corresponding 
coefficients, along with their uncertainties. By recombining the PDFs of the coefficients with 
the basis functions, a joint PDF of the ‘true’ climate change signal at each location can be ob-
tained. The results from that method are based on the most complete and recent set of models 
which in contrast to all other methods samples structural uncertainty in the models to some 
degree. However, the results share the limitations in the underlying multi model ensemble 
dataset noted above, namely that the range of AOGCMs may not adequately sample the range 
of uncertainty that we think exists. The implicit underlying distribution of climate sensitivity is 
the one of the CMIP3 AOGCM ensemble. 
 
Harris et al. (2006) combine a 17 member perturbed physics ensemble of the fully coupled 
HadCM3 AOGCM with an energy balance model and a larger ensemble of slab simulations of 
HadAM3 to emulate the probabilistic response of a large perturbed physics ensemble. As the 
Furrer et al. (2007b) method, this Hadley Centre ensemble (Harris et al., 2006) does not con-
sider carbon cycle uncertainties. 
 
Both the new AOGCM results and the probabilistic studies confirm that the anthropogenically 
forced short term temperature response (i.e. ignoring the possibility of several large volcanic 
eruptions in the near future, dashed CDFs) is quite well constrained (in terms of absolute un-
certainty), with relatively consistent results across different methods. Temperature changes are 
almost independent of the scenario for the first few decades of the projections. This is because 
the scenarios are similar in terms of emissions at the beginning, and because part of the short 
term warming is a delayed response to radiative forcing caused by past emissions. About half 
of the warming over the next few decades would occur even if the levels of atmospheric con-
stituents and thus radiative forcing were held constant at year 2000 values (constant composi-
tion commitment) (Meehl et al., 2005; Wigley, 2005; Meehl et al., 2007). This commitment 
idea, i.e. that warming will continue even if the forcing is held constant, has been recognized 
long ago (Hansen et al., 1984; Siegenthaler and Oeschger, 1984; Wigley and Schlesinger, 
1985; Schlesinger, 1986). Also, some climate feedbacks or non-linear interactions only be-
come important on longer timescales. 
 
The similarity of the short-term projections must not be misinterpreted as an argument that the 
choice of the scenario is unimportant for climate change. On the contrary, it highlights the long 
timescales of the climate system, implying that scenario choices today have an effect in the far 
future (e.g. Hansen et al., 1988; Wigley et al., 1996; Knutti et al., 2002; Stott and Kettlebor-
ough, 2002). The increasing importance of scenario-dependence over time arises because the   6
temperature response of the system is determined by the stock of atmospheric greenhouse gas-
es, rather than the flows represented by annual emissions. A consequence of this is that mitiga-
tion efforts must be started soon to become effective in the long term and avoid large (and po-
tentially very high impact) climate change, since much more drastic mitigation efforts would 
be needed later to avoid large future changes. Because of the long timescales involved in the 
carbon cycle and the deep ocean, it will take centuries or millennia, even for substantial emis-
sion reductions, for the climate system to return from high levels of atmospheric concentra-
tions (e.g. 700 ppm in SRES A1B year 2100) to a state similar to that of today (Plattner et al., 
2007).  
 
The distributions for global-mean temperature change shown in Figure 2 are close to Gaussian, 
and do not show the pronounced long tail seen in many PDFs of climate sensitivity (e.g. An-
dronova and Schlesinger, 2001; Forest et al., 2002; Knutti et al., 2002; Hegerl et al., 2006). 
This reflects the non-linear relationship between TCR and climate sensitivity where the de-
pendence of the transient response on changes in climate sensitivity reduces as the sensitivity 
increases (Hansen et al., 1984; Knutti et al., 2005; Allen et al., 2006). We note that the results 
depend on the assumed prior distribution for climate sensitivity, the choice of which is cur-
rently debated (Frame et al., 2005; Annan and Hargreaves, 2006). Because of the non-linear 
relationship between TCR and climate sensitivity, however, the effect is smaller than when 
attempting to constrain climate sensitivity itself. A renormalization of all results to the same 
prior distribution of climate sensitivity is not straightforward, and would be purely of reference 
value alone since any given prior distribution is contestable. Rational minds may disagree sub-
stantially regarding the form of the appropriate prior for climate sensitivity, so any choice of 
renormalization prior would be arbitrary The results reviewed here are consistent with previ-
ous studies showing that transient climate change over the next century and the maximum 
warming under strong mitigation scenarios is better constrained by observations than the equi-
librium warming in response to greenhouse gas (GHG) levels stabilized well above preindus-
trial levels (Knutti et al., 2005; Frame et al., 2006). 
 
Despite the similarities in the shapes of the CDFs produced in different ways, there are notice-
able offsets by up to 1°C for the high scenarios. The disagreement between different methods 
is consistently larger at the upper than the lower bound; i.e., the horizontal distance between 
different CDFs (indicated by the light grey shading) is larger at the 95% level than at the 5% 
level. This highlights the importance in considering structural uncertainties, i.e., differences in 
the observational constraints used, the sources of uncertainties considered, choices in the sta-
tistical methodology, and single model biases persistent across whole ensembles, independent 
of the parameters used. Note that in all of those studies, simplifying the problem by neglecting 
certain sources of uncertainty (e.g., ignoring certain forcings, neglecting uncertainties in radia-
tive forcing for given atmospheric concentrations, neglecting uncertainties in ocean mixing, 
climate feedbacks, or in carbon cycle parameters, not accounting for internal unforced variabil-
ity) will almost always artificially reduce uncertainty ranges and lead to overly confident con-
clusions. 
 
In addition to probabilistic results, Figure 2 also shows the mean projections and one standard 
deviation ranges using the MAGICC model (Wigley and Raper, 2001), with climate feedback 
and ocean heat uptake tuned to the 1%/yr CO2 increase simulations of 19 CMIP3 AOGCMs, 
for a standard fixed carbon cycle and for carbon cycle feedbacks approximately covering the   7
C4MIP (Friedlingstein et al., 2006) range. Similarly, projections with the Bern2.5CC EMIC 
model coupled to a simplified carbon cycle model (Joos et al., 1999; Joos et al., 2001; Plattner 
et al., 2001) are shown for climate sensitivities of 1.5, 3.2 and 4.5°C (approximately covering 
the likely climate sensitivity range given in the TAR), with standard carbon cycle settings and 
with carbon cycle parameters tuned for efficient and inefficient carbon removal from the at-
mosphere to the ocean and terrestrial biosphere. 
 
The CMIP3 AOGCM results are also shown for the B1, A1B and A2 scenarios. For B2, A1T 
and A1FI no AOGCM simulations are available, so the mean AOGCM response for the year 
2100 is approximated by multiplying the mean AOGCM A1B response with the ratios of tem-
perature change between scenarios B2/A1B, A1T/A1B and A1FI/A1B, respectively, derived 
from the MAGICC model. Note that the CMIP3 models prescribe greenhouse gas concentra-
tions rather than emissions, and do not sample carbon cycle uncertainties. Results from the 
coupled carbon-cycle climate model intercomparison project (C4MIP) (Friedlingstein et al., 
2006) are shown for the A2 scenario, accounting additionally for non-CO2 forcings (blue 
crosses). The minimum to maximum range of the TAR AOGCMs as well as the minimum to 
maximum range of the TAR MAGICC model results, derived from tuning to seven of the nine 
TAR AOGCMs, are shown for comparison. The raw TAR AOGCM range (Fig. 2, orange 
lines) is wider than the MAGICC range because MAGICC was not tuned to the highest and 
lowest AOGCM in the TAR.  
 
Since the uncertainty grows with time and with increasing warming, it is instructive to study 
the relative uncertainty (i.e., the spread divided by the median versus time) for a few of the 
uncertainty estimates. Figure 3a shows that after about 2020, the relative uncertainty in the 
CMIP3 models (blue, for the subset of models that have run all three scenarios) is almost con-
stant over time, and independent of the scenario. For the EMIC PDF (Knutti et al., 2003), rela-
tive uncertainty increases slightly with time, caused by very high climate sensitivities (red). If 
climate sensitivity is assumed to be below 4.5°C in that study (magenta), the relative uncer-
tainty is almost constant over time. Note that this does not imply that this approach is a priori 
valid to derive uncertainties throughout the 21
st century as will be detailed below. In the detec-
tion case (green) (Stott et al., 2006), the uncertainty is larger in the early decades. Those re-
sults include a number of sources of uncertainty in future temperatures which are not included 
in some other uncertainty predictions. The predictions include uncertainty due to only having a 
small number of predictions from forecast ensembles of the forced response (often only one). 
In addition to the uncertainty in the underlying anthropogenically forced temperature change, 
they include uncertainty due to future natural forcing, estimated from model estimates of past 
variability in naturally forced temperatures. Finally they additionally include the uncertainty 
due to internal variability on top of the forced response and also include the extra uncertainty 
from taking the difference between two imperfectly known decadal-mean temperatures. Fur-
ther details are given in the methods section of Stott and Kettleborough (2002). The contribu-
tions from internal unforced and natural forced variability are constant over time, and thus 
their relative effect is larger in the early decades when the anthropogenic forced signal is still 
weaker. When considering only the forced response, the relative uncertainty in the early part of 
the century is about 0.4, similar to the estimates from other methods. 
 
Figure 3b shows that for methods that do not assume Gaussian distributions, the ratio of the 
5% and 50% percentile and the ratio of the 95% and 50% percentile are also remarkably con-  8
stant and similar for the EMIC (magenta, for B1 and A2) and MAGICC PDFs (black, all six 
illustrative scenarios). The uncertainty relative to the median and variations across different 
scenarios are larger at the upper bound than at the lower. 
 
While each method has its own characteristic shape for the evolution of uncertainty over time, 
they all agree that for a given method, the relative uncertainty towards the end of the century 
should be very similar for each scenario. This is because the ratio of temperature change to 
forcing is approximately constant across scenarios for the types of scenarios and timescales 
considered here. Note that the relative uncertainty for the higher emission scenario A2 is al-
ways slightly smaller than for A1B or B1, because for A2 the temperature signal is larger and 
because the relative uncertainty in the forcing is smaller due to the larger relative contribution 
of GHG forcing. When considering only the forced response, the relative uncertainty is also 
reasonably constant over time after 2020. 
 
Note that when estimating uncertainty in short term projections, for example for the decade 
2020-2029, an additional difficulty arises, which has not been considered so far in the litera-
ture. Projections are taken here as differences to the average over the 1980-1999 period, so 
effectively this is like making a projection in year 1990 for 2025, i.e. 35 years into the future. 
However, as of 2007, half of those 35 years have already passed, and the warming observed 
from the base period up to 2007 has not been considered in the projections. If the uncertainty 
is growing linearly as argued above, then the uncertainty estimate starting in the base period 
1980-1999 is likely to be too large, and it would be smaller if the observations until today had 
been used. While this is a small issue for projections for 2100 (Meehl et al., 2007), it should be 
kept in mind that for short term projections, taking differences to some base period in the past 
is problematic. The problem gets worse the further back the base period is chosen. Near-term 
uncertainties will be overestimated, even in the case where the trends of model and observa-
tions are very similar. 
 
2.2 Overall uncertainty range from multiple methods 
 
There is no formal statistical way to combine all the estimates summarized in Figure 2, since 
they are not all independent, and do not all consider the same sources of uncertainty. One op-
tion is to resort to imprecise probability (e.g. Kriegler and Held, 2005; Hall et al., 2007; 
Tomassini et al., 2007), i.e. consider an uncertainty in PDFs or sets of PDFs. However, these 
second order uncertainties are not easy to understand for the non-expert, and the dependencies 
of the different methods are an issue.  
 
The right part of Fig. 2 shows coloured bands of constant relative uncertainty around the 
CMIP3 mean for each scenario, along with all the individual PDFs and ranges from the left 
part of Fig. 2 discussed above. On the basis of the evidence presented above in support of a 
time- and scenario-independent relative uncertainty, a range of -40 to +60% around the CMIP3 
mean was adopted in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report AR4 (Meehl et al., 2007) as a ‘like-
ly’ (>66% probability) range for the projected warming in 2100,  for the purpose of giving 
policy-relevant advice that is easy to understand. The -40 to +60% range adopted in AR4 
(Meehl et al., 2007) is indicated by blue lines and represents one of several defensible synthe-
ses of the uncertainty across different models and methods. While the model results support a 
scenario-independent relative uncertainty (Fig. 3), the choice of an overall range encompassing   9
the results from different methods is partly subjective. While Fig. 2 can provide a summary 
and some guidance, it is left to the reader to make his/her own expert judgement about an 
overall uncertainty range. 
 
When interpreting the results, it is important to note that not all results are necessarily equally 
credible, and there may be processes that are incorrect or missing in different climate models. 
In addition, the assumptions in each study need to be kept in mind. Knutti et al. (2003), for 
example, who show the highest upper bound at the end of the century, used a uniform prior in 
climate sensitivity and rather poor constraints, resulting in a large fraction of simulations with 
climate sensitivities up to 10°C. A subsequent study with the same model has found stronger 
constraints on climate sensitivity (Tomassini et al., 2007), which would push the upper bound 
of the projections down. Projected ranges in Bayesian approaches also depend on the prior 
distributions (Frame et al., 2005; Tomassini et al., 2007), which are not identical in all studies, 
as discussed above. What seems undisputable from Fig. 2 is the fact that structural uncertainty 
(the differences across studies arising from different assumptions, constraints and choices of 
models) is large. Any uncertainty estimate based on a single method or model, which does not 
explicitly account for that, is therefore likely to underestimate the uncertainty. Fig. 2 also high-
lights that due to the lack of formal methods to aggregate results, the derivation of probabilis-
tic projections based on multiple lines of evidence has more subjective elements to it than the 
calculation of a PDF from a single method. 
  
2.3 Differences between IPCC TAR and AR4 ranges 
 
The ranges adopted in AR4 (Meehl et al., 2007) (Fig. 2, blue boxes in right part) based on the 
assumption of a constant relative uncertainty and using the combined information from many 
methods are substantially wider than the model ranges given in the TAR for individual scenar-
ios (Fig. 2, yellow bars) for several reasons. Although the TAR projections did account for 
climate feedbacks on the carbon cycle, they did not consider uncertainties in these feedbacks. 
The TAR range was based on a simple model tuned to seven AOGCMs, but no attempt was 
made to apply observational constraints. In contrast, the AR4 uncertainty estimates are also 
based on observational constraints and thus consistent with past observed trends and patterns. 
While the observational constraints in some of the newer methods tend to decrease projection 
uncertainties, this is outweighed by considering carbon cycle and structural uncertainties, such 
that the overall uncertainty given here is larger than in the TAR. Structural uncertainties in-
clude specific assumptions in each probabilistic method (e.g. whether uncertainty in all forcing 
components or just in the aerosol forcing is considered), in the construction of the climate 
model (e.g. choice of cloud parameterization), and in the observational constraints that are 
used (e.g. whether the model results are compared to observed spatial patterns, or just global 
averages) (see Tebaldi and Knutti (2007) for a review of open issues). These uncertainties all 
cause differences in projections between multiple methods, such that an overall uncertainty 
estimate accounting for these structural uncertainties is generally wider than an estimate from 
a single method.  
 
The central values given in AR4 for each scenario are lower than those in the TAR, but the 
differences are small, and they should not be interpreted as a revised understanding of the 
relevant processes. They are caused by the fact that the MAGICC model results (which are 
tuned to the idealized CMIP3 1%/yr CO2 increase scenarios) are slightly higher than the   10
CMIP3 results for the SRES projections mainly due to different forcing assumptions. The 
AOGCM mean was used in AR4 as the central value, while the MAGICC model results were 
used as the central numbers in the TAR. 
 
Differences between MAGICC and the CMIP3 AOGCMs arise primarily from the fact that 
many AOGCMs do not prescribe all radiative forcing components, whereas MAGICC does. In 
particular, accounting for the indirect aerosol effect (which is not included in many AOGCMs) 
in MAGICC leads to a larger radiative forcing increase between the base period 1980-1999 
and the end of the century and causes the projected change for the years 2090-2099 to be 
higher by a few tenths of a degree. Small differences can arise from the fact that the MAGICC 
climate feedback and ocean heat uptake is tuned to the 1%/yr CO2 increase rather than the sce-
nario simulations. In addition, MAGICC emulates all available AOGCM models for each sce-
nario, even if some models do not provide all scenarios. This issue of sampling is also present 
in the multi model ensemble, which is a rather arbitrary snapshot in time of models available 
for the assessment, and not necessarily representative of our understanding of all the uncertain-
ties that exist. However, those effects are small, and the different assumptions in radiative 
forcing explain a large part of the differences between MAGICC and the AOGCMs.  
 
Apart from differences between MAGICC and the AOGCMS, differences could in theory arise 
from both forcings and feedbacks being different in the new CMIP3 AOGCM ensemble (see 
Fig. 1) and the AOGCM ensemble used in the TAR. The mean of the transient climate re-
sponse (TCR, the global average surface warming at the time of CO2 doubling in an idealized 
scenario where CO2 increases by 1%/yr) is 1.8°C, with a standard deviation of 0.4°C. Both the 
mean and standard deviation of TCR are virtually identical in the old and new AOGCM en-
semble. The TCR measures the strengths of the relevant feedback processes and transient 
ocean heat uptake, does not depend on the carbon cycle, and is almost unaffected by forcing 
uncertainties. Projections for the end of the twenty-first century for SRES scenarios are line-
arly related to the TCR. Therefore, despite considerable progress in model development and 
the availability of many more models for AR4 (Meehl et al., 2007), the best estimate for the 
sum of all transient physical feedbacks remains unchanged.  
 
The projections in the TAR did not consider volcanic and solar forcing during the 20
th century. 
The inclusion of these forcings and the fact that more models now consider indirect aerosol 
forcing leads to smaller net forcing over the 20
th century and a larger net forcing increase over 
the 21
st century, and projected warming for the years 2090-2099 relative to the base period 
should be slightly higher. But additional simple model simulations, however, show the effect 
to be small, about a tenth of a degree. Differences in how other forcings are accounted for, and 
their efficacies (Hansen et al., 2005) in the different models might lead to other small differ-
ences. Unfortunately, for some of the old and new AOGCMs the information provided by the 
modelling groups about what components of the radiative forcing were used, what their mag-
nitude is, and how they were implemented, is incomplete and makes a detailed separation of 
all effects impossible.  
 
In summary, the TAR AOGCM mean (for the scenarios where it is available) is very similar to 
the AR4 AOGCM mean for both the SRES projections and the transient climate response, 
suggesting that the sum of the physical feedbacks is similar, and the effects of differences in 
forcings are not significant when averaged across all models. The differences in projections   11
from the TAR are attributable to different forcing assumptions in the MAGICC model vs. the 
CMIP3 AOGCMs, and do not reflect a change in our understanding of the sum of the relevant 
physical feedback processes that affect the transient warming.  
  
2.4 The effect of uncertainties in the carbon cycle feedbacks 
 
The overall range of different methods is larger than the CMIP3 AOGCM range, because (as 
noted above) the AOGCM simulations do not span the full possible uncertainty range and do 
not sample carbon cycle uncertainties. Climate impacts on the carbon cycle are important and 
very likely provide a positive feedback on temperature, with warming leading to a reduced 
fraction of CO2 emissions being taken up by the ocean and terrestrial biosphere, and an in-
creased fraction of the emissions staying airborne, thus causing more warming than would be 
produced if the carbon cycle were insensitive to climate change (Joos et al., 2001; Plattner et 
al., 2001; Friedlingstein et al., 2006). Figure 4 shows uncertainty ranges from different studies 
and models with no carbon cycle feedbacks (i.e. constant climate prescribed for the carbon 
cycle), with feedbacks but fixed parameters in the carbon cycle, and with feedbacks and their 
uncertainty considered by perturbing parameters in the carbon cycle in different simulations. 
Results are shown from single models with perturbed parameters in the carbon cycle 
(Bern2.5CC and MAGICC), from a probabilistic study accounting for carbon cycle feedbacks 
with a simple feedback term (Knutti et al., 2003) and for a set of structurally different C4MIP 
coupled carbon cycle models (Friedlingstein et al., 2006). Independent of model and carbon 
cycle complexity included, these results indicate that uncertainties arising from climate feed-
backs on the carbon cycle are less important than uncertainties associated with future emis-
sions and climate sensitivity (see Fig. 2), and have little effect on the lower bound of the pro-
jected range, but affect the upper bound more strongly, consistent with earlier studies (Wigley 
and Raper, 2001; Knutti et al., 2003). 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
The latest generation of CMIP3 AOGCMs used in AR4 (Meehl et al., 2007) on average pro-
jects changes of global temperature similar to the AOGCMs used in the TAR (Cubasch et al., 
2001). Best guess projections in degrees C and likely ranges (i.e. >66% probability, in brack-
ets) given in AR4 (Meehl et al., 2007) for the six illustrative SRES scenarios are B1: 1.8 (1.1 - 
2.9), B2: 2.4 (1.4 - 3.8), A1T: 2.4 (1.4 - 3.8), A1B: 2.8 (1.7 - 4.4), A2: 3.4 (2.0 - 5.4), A1FI: 
4.0 (2.4 - 6.4), while the TAR combined all six scenarios into a single projected range of 1.4 – 
5.8°C. For the six scenarios considered here, the relative contributions of scenario uncertainty 
and climate response uncertainty are similar. However, because of the very different nature of 
uncertainties in emissions scenarios vs. uncertainties in the model response, the lack of prob-
abilities assigned to scenarios, and because only a limited set of non-intervention scenarios is 
considered here, aggregating temperature ranges across scenarios should be avoided. Differ-
ences of a few tenths of a degree between the best guess values given in AR4 vs. those in the 
TAR for the year 2100 are mainly due to different forcing assumptions in the MAGICC model 
used in the TAR compared to the CMIP3 AOGCM  
 
The combined information given in Fig. 2 from many different quantitative methods with a 
variety of models and statistical methods, considering uncertainties in radiative forcing, cli-
mate feedbacks, ocean heat uptake and the carbon cycle, suggest an uncertainty in projections   12
larger than that covered by the AOGCM ensemble of opportunity, and larger than the range 
indicated in the IPCC TAR. The reason for the larger uncertainty is that uncertainties in the 
carbon cycle climate feedbacks as well as structural uncertainties in both climate models and 
probabilistic methods are considered here when aggregating all results, while those were not 
considered in the TAR. We argue that the concept of a constant relative uncertainty across 
scenarios (irrespective of what percentage is chosen) is well supported by different studies, 
and provides a simple way of giving policy relevant information. The concept of constant rela-
tive uncertainty is also very likely to hold for other non-mitigation scenarios that have similar 
characteristics as the six illustrative SRES scenarios considered here (i.e. other scenarios ap-
proximately within the SRES range), thus providing an easy way of estimating uncertainties in 
global temperature projections without running many model simulations. Uncertainties tend to 
be slightly asymmetric in many studies, with the lower bound of the expected temperature in-
crease being comparably well constrained, the upper bound being more uncertain. The larger 
uncertainty on the upper bound is caused by uncertainties in carbon cycle climate feedbacks 
(Plattner et al., 2007), which are most relevant for high warming, and by the more uncertain 
upper bound on climate sensitivity. For the same reasons, the agreement of different studies is 
better for the lower than for the upper bound.  
 
This set of projections reviewed here is based on the current understanding of climate feed-
backs and uncertainties in the carbon cycle climate interaction. While uncertainties in the for-
mer are relatively well quantified on the timescales considered here, parts of the latter are still 
poorly understood and not generally included in carbon cycle models (Friedlingstein et al., 
2006; Plattner et al., 2007). In the terrestrial biosphere for example, there is a likely tempera-
ture feedback on the methane gas cycle and the possibility that melting permafrost might cause 
the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Also, the effect of CO2 fertilization on 
plants might be smaller than previously thought (e.g. Korner et al., 2005). For the ocean car-
bon sink, changes in the atmospheric circulation may have an effect on the carbon uptake of 
the Southern Ocean (Le Quéré et al., 2007), an example of an effect that is unlikely to be cap-
tured in relatively simple carbon cycle models. Gruber et al. (2004) provide a detailed review 
of potential surprises in the biogeochemical cycles. These are examples of structural uncertain-
ties, where some processes might be entirely missing in the biogeochemistry models. It is im-
portant to note that most of those poorly understood feedbacks are likely to be positive rather 
than negative, and therefore have the potential to raise the upper bound of our temperature 
uncertainties. The uncertainty in those processes is particularly large for high emission scenar-
ios and associated large climate change, where there is no analogous situation in the past and 
present where models can be evaluated.  
 
The results reviewed here also show that the contribution of structural uncertainty to tempera-
ture projections is quite large. There is no statistical method so far to formally combine the 
different lines of evidence. This makes the interpretation of probabilistic projections not as 
straightforward as a PDF from a single method might suggest. 
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Figure 1: a) Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration for the SRES scenarios B1 (blue), A1B 
(green) and A2 (red) derived with the BernCC model (Joos et al., 2001) for the TAR (IPCC, 
2001) and used to force most of the simulations in panel b. Note that the scenarios prescribe 
emissions, and atmospheric concentrations and radiative forcings considered in the AOGCMs 
vary. b) global mean surface air temperature anomalies from the 1980-1999 average for SRES 
scenarios B1 (blue), A1B (green), A2 (red), and for the historic 20
th century simulation 
(black). Lines denote the ensemble mean, shaded bands denote one standard deviation of the 
multi-model response. Ensemble members were averaged first for each model, such that each 
model is given equal weight, although note that not all simulations are available for all mod-
els.The observed temperature for the 20
th century is given in orange for comparison (Jones and 
Moberg, 2003).   18
 
 
Figure 2: Global mean temperature projections for the six illustrative SRES scenarios. In the 
left column, the lower part of each panel shows cumulative distributions functions (CDFs) for 
global mean surface air temperature increase for short-term (2020-2029, dashed) and long-
term (2090-2099, solid) projections, relative to the 1980-1999 average. Different colors mark 
different models or statistical methods. Lines are only shown from the 5 to the 95% level, thus 
the horizontal dimension of each curve marks the 5-95% confidence range. Light-grey shading 
marks the envelope of all CDFs (see text). Labels with stars indicate that the respective 
method considers carbon cycle climate feedback uncertainties. The upper part of each panel   19
shows other estimates of uncertainty for 2090-2099. Central values and ranges are given as 
means and 5-95% from a fitted normal distribution to the AR4 AOGCM simulations (red cir-
cles and lines) for B1, A1B and A2, along with results for each individual AR4 AOGCM (red 
dots). For B2, A1T and A1FI, AOGCM means are estimated using scaling factors from the 
MAGICC model (red triangles, see text). From the MAGICC simple model (dark green sym-
bols) tuned to 19 AR4 AOGCMs, means (circles) and one standard deviations (squares) are 
given for fixed carbon cycle parameters (indicating the uncertainty caused by the climate 
only), and one standard deviation including carbon cycle uncertainties (stars). For the 
Bern2.5CC EMIC (light green symbols), the central values use a medium climate sensitivity 
and standard carbon cycle settings (circles), uncertainties are estimated by combining a high 
and low climate sensitivity with standard carbon cycle settings (squares) and by combinations 
of a low climate sensitivity and an efficient carbon cycle (i.e. removing excess carbon quickly 
from the atmosphere), and a high climate sensitivity and an inefficient carbon cycle (stars, see 
text for details) to sample the full range. Individual model results are shown for the C4MIP 
models for A2, accounting for non-CO2 forcings (blue crosses). Model means and minimum 
maximum ranges (yellow bars) given in the TAR (IPCC, 2001) resulting from the tuning of 
the MAGICC model to seven TAR AOGCMs, as well as means and minimum to maximum 
ranges from nine AOGCMs shown in the TAR (IPCC, 2001) (orange triangles and lines) are 
given for comparison. Ranges have been adjusted to match the periods 2090-2099 and 1980-
1999, and may slightly differ from the original publications. Note that some ranges are simply 
minimum to maximum ranges from a set of models, or sensitivity tests of a model, and thus 
cannot be interpreted as percentiles of a distribution. In the right column, the colour bands 
show ranges of constant relative uncertainty around the CMIP3 AOGCM mean for all scenar-
ios, along with the individual estimate from the left column. A likely range of -40 to +60% 
(blue box) around the CMIP3 AOGCM mean (thick blue line) was given in IPCC AR4 (Meehl 
et al., 2007) for the purpose of giving policy-relevant advice, based on expert judgement and 
all the individual uncertainty estimates reviewed here.   20
 
 
 
Figure 3: a) Relative uncertainty of global mean surface air temperature increase above 1980-
1999 versus time for different models and methods. For PDFs, the relative uncertainty is de-
fined here as half of the 5-95% range, divided by the median of the PDF. For the AOGCMs, 
the relative uncertainty is taken as 1.65 times the standard deviation across the models divided 
by the mean. For a normal distribution, the two definitions are identical. The relative uncer-
tainty is shown for scenarios B1 (solid), A1B (dotted) and A2 (dashed), for the subset of the 
AR4 AOGCMs (blue) that have run all three scenarios, for probabilistic projections with an 
EMIC (Knutti et al., 2003) for climate sensitivity constrained by observations (red) and cli-
mate sensitivity in the range of 1.5-4.5°C constrained by observations (magenta), and for the 
fingerprint scaling methods (Stott et al., 2006) (green) using the UK Metoffice HadCM3 (label 
H), NOAA GFDL R30 (label G) and NCAR PCM (label P) AOGCMs. The Stott et al. results 
are shown as one value per decade; the other estimates are based on ten year running means to 
reduce noise. b) 5% and 95% percentiles each divided by the median, for the EMIC PDF and 
scenarios B1 and A2 (magenta) (Knutti et al., 2003) for the MAGICC PDF  for all six illustra-
tive SRES scenarios (black) (Wigley and Raper, 2001). 
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Figure 4: Uncertainty in global mean surface temperature increase for the end of the century 
(2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999) for the SRES A2 scenario. Blue, green and red colors indi-
cate no carbon cycle feedback (i.e. climate held constant for the carbon cycle), a non-zero car-
bon cycle feedback with constant parameters, and a non-zero carbon cycle feedback with un-
certainty (perturbed parameters in the carbon cycle), respectively. Means and 1-sigma ranges 
for the MAGICC and means and min-max ranges for the Bern2.5CC models are as in Figure 2, 
with constant (green) and variable parameters in the carbon cycle (red). Results from the 
C4MIP models (Friedlingstein et al., 2006) (dots) and their mean (circle) are shown for the 
uncoupled (blue) and coupled carbon cycle (red). 5-95% ranges from PDFs derived with the 
Bern EMIC (Knutti et al., 2003) without (uncoupled, blue) and with (coupled, red) carbon cy-
cle feedbacks are shown for the case where climate sensitivity is only  constrained  by obser-
vations (as in Fig. 2). 